Routledge has published the edited volume on
Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences
(edited by Sebastian Lutz and Ádám Tamás Tuboly)
This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science.
Logical Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricism’s philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwell’s role in the worldview of logical empiricism, on Reichenbach’s account of objectivity, on the impact of Poincaré on Neurath’s early views on scientific method, Frank’s exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics, and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories, including Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s positions on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Reichenbach’s critique of unified field theory, and the logical empiricists’ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Mises’ frequentism; Frank’s account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagel’s, Feigl’s, and Hempel’s versions of logical empiricism.
This book offers a comprehensive account of the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics. It is a valuable resource for researchers interested in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, and the history of analytic philosophy.
Table of contents:
Sebastian Lutz and Adam Tamas Tuboly: Introduction: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics
Jordi Cat: The Electromagnetic Way to the Scientific World-Conception: Maxwell’s Equations at the Service of Logical Empiricism
Nikolay Milkov: Kurt Grelling and the Idiosyncrasy of the Berlin Logical Empiricism
Katherine Dunlop: The Selection of Facts in Poincaré and Neurath
Don Howard: The Philosopher Physicists: Albert Einstein and Philipp Frank
Alan Richardson: On the Empirical Refutation of Epistemological Doctrine in Hans Reichenbach’s Early Philosophy
Robert Disalle: Carnap, Einstein, and the Empirical Foundations of Space-Time Geometry
Thomas Ryckman: Einstein, General Relativity, and Logical Empiricism
Marco Giovanelli: ‘Geometrization of Physics’ Vs. ‘Physicalization of Geometry’. The Untranslated Appendix to Reichenbach’s Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
Jan Faye and Rasmus Jaksland: Did Logical Positivism Influence the Early Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?
Richard Dawid: Why Moritz Schlick’s View on Causality Is Rooted in a Specific Understanding of Quantum Mechanics
Clark Glymour: The Legacy of Logical Empiricism
Maria Carla Galavotti: Probability Theory as a Natural Science: Richard von Mises’ Frequentism
Flavia Padovani: From Physical Possibility to Probability and Back: Reichenbach’s Account of Coordination
Sebastian Lutz: Two Constants in Carnap’s View on Scientific Theories
Matthias Neuber: From the Periphery to the Center: Nagel, Feigl, and Hempel
Adam Tamas Tuboly: Understanding Metaphysics and Understanding Through Metaphysics: Philipp Frank on Scientific Theories and Their Domestication
