Books

Routledge has published the edited volume on

Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations

(edited by Tamás Demeter, T. Parent, Adam Toon)

This is the first book dedicated to exploring mental fictionalism. Featuring contributions from established authors as well as up-and-coming scholars in this burgeoning field, the book reveals the exciting potential of a fictionalist approach to the mind, as well as the challenges it faces. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on foundational debates in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics in the field, such as embodied cognition and mental representation.

What is Mental Fictionalism? Tamás Demeter, T. Parent, and Adam Toon

Part 1: Proposals

1. Mental Fictionalism Meg Wallace

2. Fictionalism and Intentionality Adam Toon

3. A Rylean Mental Fictionalism William Lycan

4. A Mental Fictionalism Worthy of Its Name Tamás Demeter

5. Enactive-Ecological Fictionalism: An Eliminativism that Works Adrian Downey

Part 2: Challenges

6. The Sellarsian Fate for Mental Fictionalism László Kocsis and Krisztián Pete

7. What We Talk about When We Talk about Mental States Zoe Drayson

8. A Brickhouse Defence for Folk Psychology: How to Defeat ‘Big Bad Wolf’ Eliminativism Dan Hutto

9. Mental Fictionalism: The Costly Combination of Magic and the Mind Amber Ross

10. The Pragmatic Approach to Fictive Utterances and its Consequences for Mental Fictionalism Miklós Márton and János Tőzsér

Part 3: Explorations

11. I Think; Therefore, I am a Fiction T. Parent

12. Psychiatric Fictionalism Sam Wilkinson

13. Three Kinds of Fictionalism about Knowledge-Talk Julianne Chung

14. Mental Fictionalism: A Foothold Amid Deflationary Collapse Meg Wallace

Part 4: Alternatives

15. Mental Fact and Mental Fiction Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas

16. Interpretivism and Mental Fictionalism Bruno Mölder

17. Rejecting the Metaphysics of the Mental: An Advertisement for a Conceptual-Cartographical Exploration of our ‘Folk-Psychological’ Practices Julia Tanney

18. Am I a Fictionalist? Daniel C. Dennett.

SUNY Press has published the edited volume on

Philipp Frank: The Humanistic Background of Science
(edited by George A. Reisch and Ádám Tamás Tuboly)

The once-lost introduction to the philosophy of science by Philipp Frank (1884-1966), a leading member of the Vienna circle of philosophers and biographer of Albert Einstein.

Philipp Frank (1884–1966) was an influential philosopher of science, public intellectual, and Harvard educator whose last book, The Humanistic Background of Science, is finally available. Never published in his lifetime, this original manuscript has been edited and introduced to highlight Frank's remarkable but little-known insights about the nature of modern science—insights that rival those of Karl Popper and Frank's colleagues Thomas Kuhn and James Bryant Conant. As a leading exponent of logical empiricism and a member of the famous Vienna Circle, Frank intended his book to provide an accessible, engaging introduction to the philosophy of science and its cultural significance. The book is steadfastly true to science; to aspirations of peace, unity, and human flourishing after World War II; and to the pragmatic philosophies of Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey that Frank embraced in his new American home. Amidst the many recent surveys and retrospective analyses of midcentury philosophy of science, The Humanistic Background of Science offers an original, first-hand view of Frank's post-European life and of intellectual dramas then unfolding in Chicago, New York City, and Boston.

Table of contents:

Philipp Frank: A Crusader for Scientific Philosophy

PART I

1. Introduction: Science, Facts, and Values

2. The Longing for a Humanization of Science

3. Metaphysical Interpretations of Science

4. The Sociology of Metaphysical Interpretations

5. Philosophy of Science and Political Ideology

6. Sociology of Science and the Search for a Democratic Metaphysics

PART II

7. Scholastic Philosophy and Thomism

8. The Physical Universe as a Symbol

9. Union, Divorce, and Reunion between Science and Philosophy

10. Science, Democracy, and the New Wave of Positivism

11. The Vienna Circle: Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath

12. Pragmatism

13. Mechanistic and Dialectical Materialism

14. The Laws and Politics of Dialectical Materialism

Conclusion: Einstein's Philosophy of Science

Special issue of Synthese on "Humeanisms", edited by Tamás Demeter, László Kocsis, Iulian D. Toader, has been published.

link: https://link.springer.com/journal/11229/topicalCollection/AC_9d20e4ed06f82f31ddb2d12a31efe433

Contributions include:

1. László Kocsis, Tamás Demeter & Iulian D. Toader: Varieties of Humeanism: an introduction

2. Stefanie Rocknak: Regularity and certainty in Hume’s treatise: a Humean response to Husserl

3. Rachel Cohon: Hume’s practice theory of promises and its dissimilar descendants

4. Vera Matarese: Super-Humeanism and physics: A merry relationship?

5. Miren Boehm: Hume’s “projectivism” explained

6. Aaron Segal: Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological

7. Barry Loewer: The package deal account of laws and properties (PDA)

8. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe: A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons

9. Daniel Dohrn: A Humean modal epistemology

10. Barbara Vetter: Explanatory dispositionalism

11. Dan O’Brien: Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony

12. Tudor M. Baetu: How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience 

13. Tamás Demeter: Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind

14. Michael Esfeld: Super-Humeanism and free will

15. David Mark Kovacs: The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature

16. Sean Morris: Carnap, Quine, and the Humean condition

Springer has published the edited volume on

Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity
(edited by Matthias Neuber and Ádám Tamás Tuboly)

This volume is dedicated to the life and work of Ernest Nagel (1901-1985) counted among the influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. Forgotten by the history of philosophy of science community in recent years, this volume introduces Nagel’s philosophy to a new generation of readers and highlights the merits and originality of his works.

Best known in the history of philosophy as a major American representative of logical empiricism with some pragmatist and naturalist leanings, Nagel’s interests and activities went beyond these limits. His career was marked with a strong and determined intention of harmonizing the European scientific worldview of logical empiricism and American naturalism/pragmatism. His most famous and systematic treatise on, The Structure of Science, appeared just one year before Thomas Kuhn’s even more renowned, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

As a reflection of Nagel’s interdisciplinary work, the contributing authors’ articles are connected both historically and systematically. The volume will appeal to students mainly at the graduate level and academic scholars. Since the volume treats historical, philosophical, physical, social and general scientific questions, it will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, epistemologists, social scientists, and anyone interested in the history of analytic philosophy and twentieth-century intellectual history.

Table of contents:

Matthias Neuber: Introduction: Ernest Nagel and the Making of Philosophy of Science a Profession

Yvonne Nagel: Ernest Nagel: A Biography

Sander Verhaegh: Nagel’s Philosophical Development

Fons Dewulf: The Emergence of Scientific Explanation as a Problem for Philosophy of Science: Aristotle, Nagel, and Hempel

Thomas Mormann: From Cautious Enthusiasm to Profound Disenchantment: Ernest Nagel and Carnapian Logical Empiricism

Raphael Riel: Nagel on Idealization in Science

David Atkinson (et al.): Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Ernest Nagel and the Uncertainty Principle

Marij Strien: Ernest Nagel on Determinism as a Guiding Principle and Its Compatibility with Quantum Mechanics

Maria Carla Galavotti: On Nagel’s Truth-Frequency Theory of Probability

Bohang Chen: On Ernest Nagel on Teleology in Biology

Matthias Neuber: Nagel on the Methodology of the Social Sciences

Eric Schliesser: Philosophy of Science as First Philosophy: The Liberal Polemics of Ernest Nagel

Matthias Neuber (et al.): Interview with Ernest Nagel by Remmel Nunn

Matthias Neuber (et al.): Ernest Nagel’s “The Philosophy of Science” Lecture at the Delaware Seminar

Routledge has published the edited volume on

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences
(edited by Sebastian Lutz and Ádám Tamás Tuboly)

This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods, concepts, and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricists’ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments, thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science.

Logical Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricism’s philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwell’s role in the worldview of logical empiricism, on Reichenbach’s account of objectivity, on the impact of Poincaré on Neurath’s early views on scientific method, Frank’s exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics, and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories, including Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s positions on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Reichenbach’s critique of unified field theory, and the logical empiricists’ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Mises’ frequentism; Frank’s account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagel’s, Feigl’s, and Hempel’s versions of logical empiricism.

This book offers a comprehensive account of the logical empiricists’ philosophy of physics. It is a valuable resource for researchers interested in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, and the history of analytic philosophy.

Table of contents:

Sebastian Lutz and Adam Tamas Tuboly: Introduction: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics

Jordi Cat: The Electromagnetic Way to the Scientific World-Conception: Maxwell’s Equations at the Service of Logical Empiricism

Nikolay Milkov: Kurt Grelling and the Idiosyncrasy of the Berlin Logical Empiricism

Katherine Dunlop: The Selection of Facts in Poincaré and Neurath

Don Howard: The Philosopher Physicists: Albert Einstein and Philipp Frank

Alan Richardson: On the Empirical Refutation of Epistemological Doctrine in Hans Reichenbach’s Early Philosophy

Robert Disalle: Carnap, Einstein, and the Empirical Foundations of Space-Time Geometry

Thomas Ryckman: Einstein, General Relativity, and Logical Empiricism

Marco Giovanelli: ‘Geometrization of Physics’ Vs. ‘Physicalization of Geometry’. The Untranslated Appendix to Reichenbach’s Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre

Jan Faye and Rasmus Jaksland: Did Logical Positivism Influence the Early Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?

Richard Dawid: Why Moritz Schlick’s View on Causality Is Rooted in a Specific Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Clark Glymour: The Legacy of Logical Empiricism

Maria Carla Galavotti: Probability Theory as a Natural Science: Richard von Mises’ Frequentism

Flavia Padovani: From Physical Possibility to Probability and Back: Reichenbach’s Account of Coordination

Sebastian Lutz: Two Constants in Carnap’s View on Scientific Theories

Matthias Neuber: From the Periphery to the Center: Nagel, Feigl, and Hempel

Adam Tamas Tuboly: Understanding Metaphysics and Understanding Through Metaphysics: Philipp Frank on Scientific Theories and Their Domestication